This paper is concerned with a model of a one-sided limit order book, viewed as a noncooperative game for n players. Agents offer various quantities of an asset at different prices, ranging over a finite set Ω ν = {(i/ν)P ; i = 1, . . . , ν}, competing to fulfill an incoming order, whose size X is not known a priori. Players can have different payoff functions, reflecting different beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset and probability distribution of the random variable X.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with a bidding game for n players. In the basic setting, we assume that an external buyer asks for a random amount of X > 0 of shares of a certain asset. This amount will be bought at the lowest available price, as long as this price does not exceed a given upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of this asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori.
Having observed the prices asked by his competitors, each seller must determine an optimal pricing strategy, maximizing his expected payoff. Clearly, when other sellers are present, asking a higher price for the asset increases the expected profit achieved by the sale, but reduces the probability that the asset will actually be sold. This same model was recently studied in [4] , assuming that the prices asked by the bidders could range over the continuum of real numbers. In such case, under natural hypotheses the authors proved that the noncooperative game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, where all players (except one, at most) adopt price distributions which are absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure.
In the present paper we analyze the more realistic case where the price distributions take a discrete set of values, ranging within the finite set Ω ν = p k . = k ν P ; k ∈ {1, . . . , ν} ,
for some integer ν > 1. In our model we assume that the i-th player owns an amount κ i > 0 of asset. He can put all of it on sale at a given price, or offer different portions at different prices. In general, his strategy will thus be described by a vector
where µ ik denotes the amount offered for sale by the i-th player at the price p k .
The paper has two main goals, namely (i) to study the Nash equilibrium, when prices range in a discrete set of values, and (ii) to show that, as ν → ∞, these discrete equilibrium solutions converge to the solution of a Nash equilibrium where prices range on a continuum interval of values [0, P ].
A major difference between the discrete and continuum case is how bids are prioritized. When prices range over all continuum values, as proved in [4] , in a Nash equilibrium no two players offer a positive amount of asset exactly at the same price. Hence, if a buying order of size X arrives, the amounts sold by the various players are uniquely determined by the prices at which the sellers post their offers. However, in the discrete case, it may well happen that two or more players offer positive amounts of asset for sale at exactly the same price p k . In this case, one needs to specify in which order the bids of the various players will be executed. As modeling assumption, we assume the following.
(H1) Players are given a fixed ranking. Hence, if they all put assets on sale at any given price p ℓ , the buyer will start by taking assets from the first player, then from the second, and so on, until his order is fulfilled.
There are further differences between the models studied in [4] and in the present paper.
In [4] , all players assigned the same probability distribution to the random variable X, and had the same payoff function. Here we consider the far more general case of heterogeneous players, holding different beliefs about the fundamental value of the assets put on sale and on the random variable X describing the size of the incoming order.
The techniques used in the analysis are also different. In [4] the existence of a Nash equilibrium was proved by solving a system of ODEs providing necessary conditions, and checking that the solution actually provided the unique Nash equilibrium to the bidding game. The present paper, on the other hand, is based on the analysis of the best reply map. Under suitable assumptions, we prove that this map is upper semicontinuous with compact convex values, hence by Kakutani's theorem it has a fixed point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 collects the main definitions and assumptions of our model. In particular, in (2.7)-(2.8) we introduce three classes of random variables, called Type A + , Type A 0 , and Type B. In Sections 3 and 4 we study the optimization problem faced by each single player, determining necessary conditions for optimality and studying the topological properties of the set of solutions. We show that for random variables of Type A + the optimal strategy is always unique, while for random variables of Type A 0 there is a compact, convex set of optimal strategies. Finally, in the case of random variables of Type B, the set of optimal strategies may not be convex (in fact, not even connected).
Section 5 contains our main results on the existence or non-existence of a Nash equilibria for discrete bidding strategies. If each random variable X i is of type A + or A 0 , then we prove that a Nash equilibrium exists. On the other hand, if all random variables X i are of type B, then there cannot be any Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1. In [4] the existence result was proved by solving a system of ODEs and explicitly constructing the optimal strategies for each player. That approach also yielded the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Here we use a more standard topological technique, applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem to a family of discrete approximation. By its nature, this approach is more general but does not yield information about the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
In Section 6 we consider the limit as ν → ∞, so that the mesh size approaches zero. By possibly choosing a subsequence, we prove that a sequence of discrete Nash equilibria converges to a continuum Nash equilibrium, where strategies take values within the real line. In particular, this analysis allows us to extend the existence theorem proved in [4] to the case of heterogeneous players, with different payoff functions.
Several recent papers have been devoted to the modeling of the limit order book. In some of these models [2, 5, 11] the prices vary in a discrete set, while in other models [1, 8, 10, 12] the prices are allowed to range in a continuum set. The main goal of these models is to study an optimization problem for an agent who wants to execute market orders or post limit orders, or both (as in [7] ), maximizing a prescribed utility function.
The main feature of our model is that we consider the limit order book as the outcome of a noncooperative game, where several different players are trying to maximize their (possibly different) utility functions. In this aspect, our model is similar to the model by Roşu [13] . A major difference lies in the fact that in our model the utility functions of the players are determined by the probability distributions for the size of the incoming market order, and not by the expected waiting time of the order execution.
In addition to the classical paper [9] , for an introduction to non-cooperative games and Nash equilibria we refer to [3, 6, 14, 15] .
Discrete bidding strategies
Consider a bidding game for n players, competing to fulfill a incoming order whose size is not a priori known. The optimization problem faced by the i-th player can be formulated in terms of the following data.
(i) A non-negative random variable X i , whose distribution is described by
This probability distribution reflects the beliefs of the i-th agent about the size of the incoming order.
(ii) A constant p i > 0 describing the fundamental value of the asset, according to the i-th player.
(iii) The total amount κ i > 0 of assets put on sale the i-th player.
(iv) A nondecreasing function Φ i : Ω ν → IR + . Here Φ i (p k ) describes the total amount of assets put on sale by all the other agents at prices ≤ p k , having priority over the bid of the i-th player at price p k .
It will be convenient to use the Lagrangian variable β ∈ [0, κ i ] to describe a particular asset put on sale by the i-th agent. By a pricing strategy for the i-th player we mean any nondecreasing, left continuous function
Notice that φ i is uniquely determined by the ν-tuple µ i in (1.1). Indeed,
3)
The expected payoff for the i-th player is then computed by
Notice that φ i (β) − p i is the profit achieved by selling the asset β at price φ i (β), while ψ i (β + Φ i (φ i (β))) is the probability that this particular asset will be actually sold.
We say that φ * i is an optimal pricing strategy if
for every other admissible strategy φ : [0,
Next, consider n agents offering for sale quantities κ 1 , . . . , κ n of the same asset. Let µ ik be the amount put on sale at price p k by the i-th agent. Recalling the prioritizing rule (H1), we define the functions
We say that an n-tuple of strategies (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) is a Nash equilibrium if, defining the corresponding functions Φ * i as in (2.6), one has
for every i = 1, . . . , n and any other pricing strategy
As indicated by the analysis in [4] , the existence of a Nash equilibrium strongly depends on the properties of the random variables X i . Throughout the following, we assume (H2) For i = 1, . . . , n, the maps s → ψ i (s) are continuously differentiable and satisfy
Motivated by [4] , we shall consider three main classes of random variables, depending on whether the function
is log-convex, log-linear, or log-concave.
Definition. We say that the random variable X in (2.7) is
We observe that ψ is of type A 0 if and only if
for some λ > 0 .
On the other hand, when α > 0 the probability distribution
yields a probability distribution of type B. Roughly speaking, a probability distribution is of type A + if its density decays slower than a negative exponential, and of type B if its density decays faster than a negative exponential.
Necessary conditions for an optimal bidding strategy
Let a positive, nondecreasing function Φ i : [0, P ] → IR + be given, and consider the optimization problem for the i-th player, who wishes to maximize the expected payoff J i (φ, Φ i ) in (2.5) over all admissible strategies φ : [0, κ i ] → Ω ν . As remarked earlier, the set of admissible strategies can be identified with the set S i of ν-tuples
In this section we seek necessary conditions for the optimality of µ i . In the case of two similar players, these will provide an explicit formula describing the discrete Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (optimality conditions).
Given a positive, nondecreasing function
Proof. Consider the following perturbation:
A direct computation yields
Since φ i is optimal, we conclude
Similarly, by considering the perturbation:
we obtain the converse inequality. Hence (3.9) holds.
Remark 2. The previous result can be restated in terms of the values µ ik as follows:
Given a positive, nondecreasing function Φ i , let µ i = (µ i1 , . . . , µ iν ) be a best reply for the i-th player.
If µ iℓ > 0 for some ℓ > 1, then
Moreover, if µ iℓ > 0 for some ℓ < ν, then
In the particular case where the random incoming order is exponentially distributed, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1.
Assume that ψ i (s) = e −λ i s , and let (µ i1 , . . . , µ iν ) be an optimal pricing strategy for the i-th player. Then
Properties of the set of best replies
In this section, given a positive, nondecreasing function Φ i : Ω ν → IR, we analyze the set of best replies for the i-th player. These are left-continuous, nondecreasing functions .2), which maximize the expected payoff (2.5).
To simplify our notation, given 0 < p 0 < P , κ > 0, and a positive nondecreasing function Φ 0 : Ω ν → IR + , we consider the optimization problem
The maximum is sought among all nondecreasing functions
As in (2.3), setting µ ℓ . = meas {β ; φ(β) = p ℓ } , the set of admissible strategies can be identified with the set of vectors
Clearly S is a compact, convex subset of IR ν . Setting µ 0 = 0, a direct computation yields
From (4.11) it is clear that the map µ → J(µ, Φ 0 ) is continuous. Hence it attains a maximum on the compact set S. More precisely, the set S max of vectors (µ 1 , . . . , µ ν ) where the maximum is attained is a nonempty, compact subset of S. Aim of this section is to study the geometry of this set S max .
Lemma 1. If the random variable X is of type A + , then the optimization problem (4.10) admits a unique optimal solution.
. . , p ν } be two optimal strategies. If φ 1 = φ 2 , then (by possibly permuting the indices 1,2) we can find an interval
(4.12)
We claim that, for θ = a and for θ = b, the above implies
would yield an expected payoff strictly greater than φ 1 and φ 2 . The other cases are ruled out by a similar argument.
2. If (4.12) holds, then for every θ ∈ [a, b] the interpolated strategy
is also admissible. We now define J(θ) .
Indeed,
and the continuity of the map θ → J(θ) is clear. To prove continuous differentiability, we compute
At points where both φ 1 and φ 2 are constant, the continuity of the right hand side of (4.15) is trivial. Next, let θ be one of the finitely many points where φ 1 has an upward jump. Since φ 1 is optimal, the necessary conditions (3.9) yield
The same equality holds at points where φ 2 jumps. Hence the map θ → J(θ) is continuously differentiable.
3. Next, consider an interior point θ * ∈]a, b[ where d dθ J(θ) = 0. We claim that J attains a strict local maximum at θ * .
Indeed, choose δ > 0 such that φ 1 , φ 2 are both constant on the interval ]θ * , θ * + δ]. For θ ∈]θ * , θ * + δ] we then have 
4.
As a consequence of (4.13), when θ = a and θ = b the maximum expected payoff is achieved:
Therefore, the function J in (4.14) must achieve its global minimum on [a, b] at some interior point θ * ∈ ]a, b[ . This implies dJ dθ (θ * ) = 0. and hence, as proved in the previous step, J must attains a strict local maximum at θ * . We thus reach a contradiction, proving the theorem.
Lemma 2. Assume that the random variable X is of type A 0 , with ψ(s) = e −λs . Then the problem (4.10) admits a compact, convex set of optimal solutions. Indeed, there is a subset Ω opt = {p i(1) , p i(2) , . . . , p i(m) } ⊆ Ω ν such that a strategy (µ 1 , . . . , µ ν ) is optimal if and only if µ j = 0 for all j / ∈ Ω opt .
Proof. 1. Let µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ ν ) be an optimal strategy. We claim that there exists a constant
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ν} such that µ k > 0.
Indeed, if there is only one price p k such that µ k > 0, then the conclusion is trivial. Next, assume that µ is supported on the set Ω . = {p j(1) , p j(2) , . . . , p j(m) } ⊆ Ω ν , for some j(1) < j(2) < · · · < j(m). For 1 < ℓ ≤ m, consider the perturbed strategy µ ε .
= (µ ε 1 , . . . µ ε ν ) where
Since µ ε is admissible for |ε| small enough, by optimality we must have
By induction on ℓ = 2, 3, . . . , m, we conclude that all quantities in (4.19), for µ k > 0, coincide.
2.
Ifμ ∈ S is any strategy supported on the same set {p j(1) , p j (2) , . . . , p j(m) } as µ, thenμ is optimal as well. Indeed, thanks to (4.19) we obtain
3. We now prove that the set of optimal strategies is convex. Let µ , µ ′ ∈ S be optimal. Denote by
the supports of µ and µ ′ respectively. Since µ is optimal, by (4.19) there exists a constant C such that
Similarly, since µ ′ is optimal, there exists a constant C ′ such that
Since µ and µ ′ are both optimal, they achieve the same payoff. Hence C = C ′ and any strategy supported on Ω ∪ Ω ′ is also optimal. In particular, for any θ ∈ [0, 1], the convex combination θµ + (1 − θ)µ ′ is optimal as well.
Lemma 3. Let the random variable X be of type B, and let φ : [0, κ] → Ω ν be an optimal strategy. Then φ is constant.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that φ has a jump at β * ∈]0, κ[. Then the necessary conditions (3.9) hold. For |ε| sufficiently small, define
By optimality we have
For any ε ∈]0, ε 0 [ sufficiently small, a similar computation as in (4.16) now yields
A similar argument as in (4.17)-(4.18), but using the fact that X is of type B and hence (ln ψ(s)) ′′ < 0 for all s > 0, we now obtain
Therefore, for all ε ∈ ]0, ε 0 ] sufficiently small,
Together with (4.20), this proves that φ cannot be an optimal strategy.
Assuming that the variable X is of type B, the following example shows that, for any κ > 0, one can construct a piecewise constant Φ 0 with exactly one jump such that the optimization problem (4.10) has exactly two solutions. In particular, the solution set is not convex.
Example 1. Assume (ln ψ(s)) ′′ < 0 for all s > 0, and let
Since by the previous Lemma any optimal pricing strategy must be constant, the only two optimal candidates are φ(β) ≡ p k−1 , or φ(β) ≡ P . The corresponding payoffs are
Consider the function
It is easy to see that there exists a solution α * to the equation f (α) =
. This follows from the fact that f is continuously differentiable, f ′ < 0, and lim α→∞ f (α) = 0. Hence, by choosing α = α * in (4.21), we see that φ(β) ≡ p k−1 and φ(β) ≡ P are both optimal, and this shows that the set of best replies is not connected, thus not convex.
Existence of a discrete Nash equilibrium
In this section we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, when each probability distribution ψ i is either of type A 0 or of type A + .
Theorem 2. Consider a discrete pricing game for n players, with strategies given by (2.2) and payoffs as in (2.5), (2.6) . Assume that the selling priorities are determined by (H1) and that each probability distribution ψ i is either of type A 0 or A + . Then the game admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The set of of admissible strategies for the i-th player can be identified with the compact convex set
On the cartesian product S . = S 1 × · · · × S n consider the multifunction
where R i ⊆ S i is the set of all best replies for player i to the strategies (µ 1 , . . . µ i−1 , µ i+1 , µ n ) adopted by the other n − 1 players.
By the continuity of the maps J i , which is clear from from (4.11), the multifunction R has closed graph. Moreover, by Lemmas 1 and 2 in the previous section, the sets R i of best replies are compact, convex. Applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem (see for example [3] ), we obtain an n-tuple of admissible strategies (µ * 1 , . . . , µ * n ) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n such that µ * i ∈ R i (µ * 1 , . . . µ * i−1 , µ * i+1 , µ * n ) for every i =, . . . , n. This provides a Nash equilibrium to the discrete pricing game.
Example 2 (discrete Nash equilibrium for two players). Consider a bidding game for two players with the same payoff functional. More precisely, assume that in (2.5) one has p 1 = p 2 = p, ψ 1 (s) = ψ 2 (s) = e −s . Assume that Player 1 has selling priority, in case both players ask the same price. For notational convenience, we write v ℓ .
Two cases can arise, depending on the total amounts κ 1 , κ 2 of assets put on sale by the two players.
Then a Nash equilibrium is given by:
Indeed, the following optimality conditions for Player 2 are satisfied:
(i) Any pricing strategy φ 2 taking values within the set {p i * , . . . , p ν } yields the same payoff for Player 2;
(ii) Any strategy φ 2 taking values on a set which is not a subset of {p i * , . . . , p ν } yields a strictly lower payoff.
To verify (i) consider any pricing strategy φ 2 : [0, κ 2 ] → {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p ν }, taking values inside the set {p i * , . . . , p ν }. We have
By the definition of i * it follows
which is the payoff corresponding to the constant pricing strategy φ 2 (β) ≡ p i * −1 .
Consider now another strategy, φ ε 2 (β) where Player 2 sells an amount ε > 0 of shares at price p i * −1 . The corresponding expected payoff is
A simple computation shows that
where we assume that ν is large enough so that p i * −1 > p and used the fact that v i * < v i * . We conclude that
With similar arguments, we can verify the same optimality conditions for Player 1. If φ 1 (β) is any pricing strategy taking values in {p i * , . . . , p ν }, then
and it is clearly not optimal to sell at lower prices, since Player 1 has the priority.
Again,we can show that any strategy φ 1 yields the same payoff to the first player if it takes values in the set {p j * +1 , . . . , p ν } and that the payoff for Player 2 is the same for any pricing strategy supported on {p j * , . . . , p ν−1 }. Indeed, we have
In Theorem 2, the assumption that every probability distribution is of type A + or A 0 was crucial. We now give another example showing that, if each probability distribution is of type B then a Nash equilibrium in general does not exist.
Example 3. Consider a discrete bidding game for two players, putting on sale κ 1 , κ 2 > 0 amounts of shares, and let p 1 ≤ p 2 < P be given. Assume that (ln ψ i (s)) ′′ > 0 for i = 1, 2 and all s > 0. As usual, we assume that Player 1 has priority over Player 2. By Lemma 3, every optimal strategy φ i is constant, hence any Nash equilibrium (φ * 1 , φ * 2 ) has the form
for some j 1 , j 2 ∈ {1, . . . , ν}. Clearly p j 1 > p 1 and p j 2 > p 2 ≥ p 1 , otherwise one of the payoffs would be negative.
If ν is large enough, then
(5.22) We now observe that
• if j 1 = j 2 < ν, then the strategy φ 2 ≡ p ν yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 2;
• if j 1 = j 2 = ν, then by (5.22) the strategy φ 2 ≡ p j 2 −1 yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 2;
• if j 1 < j 2 , then the strategy φ 1 ≡ p j 2 yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 1;
• if j 2 < j 1 < ν, then the strategy φ 1 ≡ p ν yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 1;
• if j 2 + 1 < j 1 , then the strategy φ 2 ≡ p j 2 +1 yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 2;
• if j 2 = ν − 1 and j 1 = ν, then by (5.22) the strategy φ 2 ≡ p ν−1 yields a strictly higher expected payoff for Player 1.
We conclude that a Nash equilibrium cannot exist.
Convergence of discrete approximations
In this section we let ν → ∞, so that the mesh size P /ν approaches zero. We show that any weak limit of discrete Nash equilibria provides a Nash equilibrium for a bidding game where prices are allowed to range continuously over the reals.
Theorem 3. Let κ 1 , . . . , κ n > 0 be given. Assume that, for every ν ≥ 1, the n-tuple of strategies (φ ν 1 , . . . , φ ν n ) provides a Nash equilibrium to the discrete bidding game in (2.5), (2.6). By selecting an infinite subset of indices I ⊆ IN , one can achieve the pointwise convergence
The n-tuple (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) provides a Nash equilibrium to the bidding game, with prices ranging continuously over the reals.
Proof. 1. By possibly choosing a subsequence, since all functions φ ν i are nondecreasing, by Helly's compactness theorem we can assume the pointwise convergence in (6.23).
2. We claim that each limit strategy φ * i is optimal for the i-th player, in reply to the left continuous function
Since Φ − i (p) is nondecreasing and left continuous, hence lower semicontinuous, for every β
By Fatou's lemma, we conclude 
This strategy satisfies
For all ν ≥ 1 sufficiently large we have
The first inequality in (6.27) is an immediate consequence of (6.26). The second follows from the lower semicontinuity of Φ − i and the pointwise relation Φ
. The third inequality follows from the optimality of φ ν i in response to Φ ν i . Together, (6.27) and (6.25) yield
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that φ * i is an optimal reply to Φ − i .
3.
Our next goal is to prove that, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the limit function Φ
We claim that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it is never optimal for the i-th player to put anything on sale at price p < p i + δ. Indeed, by putting the same asset for sale at price P , his expected gain (per unit of asset) would be
This proves our claim.
4.
Given an integer ν > 2P /δ, let (µ ν 1 , . . . , µ ν n ) be a discrete Nash equilibrium corresponding to the mesh size P ν . Fix some k < ν and assume that some agent is selling at price p k , i.e. Let i * be the player with lowest priority among those selling at price p k . Then, by optimality (considering the first share he is selling at price p k ) we obtain
By the mean value theorem, there exists some
with c 0 .
, and δ as in (6.28).
In order to estimate µ ν i * k , we observe that somebody with higher priority than i * must be selling at price p k+1 , otherwise Player i * would achieve a larger expected payoff by becoming the first seller at price p k+1 . Call j * < i * the first seller at price p k+1 . Then, by optimality, we have
As before, this yields the bound This implies that every function Φ i is Lipschitz continuous on [0, P [ . In particular, Φ i (p) = Φ − i (p) for p < P .
5.
We claim that, by possibly shrinking the countable set I ∈ IN , in the limit (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) at most one of the players puts a positive amount of assets for sale at price P . For each ν ≥ 1, let (µ ν 1 , . . . , µ ν n ) be a corresponding discrete Nash equilibrium. Let ι(ν) ∈ {1, . . . , n} denote the player with lowest priority, among those who are selling something at price P : ι(ν) . = max{i ; µ ν iν > 0}. By possibly choosing a further subsequence, we can assume that ι(ν) = ι * for all ν .
If ι * = 1, there is nothing to prove, since only one player is selling at the highest price. If ι * > 1, we use the optimality conditions (applied to the first share that player ι * sells at price P ) to bound the amount of shares put on sale at P by the remaining players:
which, as before, yields proving that the n-tuple of pricing strategies (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) provides a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.
In the case where all players have the same payoff function and assign the same probability distribution to the random incoming order X, it was proved in [4] that the Nash equilibrium in the continuum model is unique. In this case, the entire sequence of discrete Nash equilibria must converge to this unique limit.
